Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) ................	17Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330	(10th Cir. 1971) .................................	21Roberts v. United States Jaycees,	468 U.S. 609 (1984) ..............................	11United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259	(9th Cir. 1975) ..................................	3,17United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749	(11th Cir. 1988) .................................	3,16United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir.),	cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1021	(1989) ...............	19,20,												21United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985	(5th Cir. 1980) ..................................	16United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d, 447	(10th Cir. 1990) .................................	2United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172	(5th Cir. 1979) ..................................	25United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923	(10th Cir. 1982) .................................	3,17,												21,23United States v. Patterson, 627 F.2d 760	(5th Cir. 1980) ..................................	23United States v. Pierce, 561 F.d 735 (9th Cir. 1982),	cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) ................	16United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.),	cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980) ................	21,22-												23United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839	(3rd Cir. 1981) ..................................	15United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144	(5th Cir. 1979) ..................................	3,16,												17,24COURT RULESEleventh Circuit Rule 26.1 ...........................	C-1Fed. R. App. P. 29 ...................................	iFed. R. Crim. Pro. 20 .................................	1STATUTES18 U.S.C.  371 ......................................	118 U.S.C.  1343 ......................................	118 U.S.C.  2314 ......................................	118 U.S.C.  2701 et seq. ..............................	718 U.S.C.  3551 et seq. ..............................	1318 U.S.C.  3553(a) ...................................	13,1418 U.S.C.  3553(a)(2)(A) .............................	1818 U.S.C.  3563(b) ...................................	1418 U.S.C.  3563(b)(1)-(10), (12)-(20) ................	14,2218 U.S.C.  3563(b)(6) ................................	2418 U.S.C.  3563(b)(7) ................................	2218 U.S.C.  3563(b)(9) ................................	2318 U.S.C.  3563(b)(21) ...............................	1418 U.S.C.  3583(a) ...................................	1318 U.S.C.  3583(d) ...................................	3,13,14												19,2218 U.S.C.  3583(d)(2) ................................	13,1818 U.S.C.  3651 ......................................	15,1628 U.S.C.  991-998 ...................................	1328 U.S.C.  1291 ......................................	xUNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 5B1.4 ...............................................	14 5F1.5, Commentary ...................................	24LEGISLATIVE MATERIALSS. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.	reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.	& Ad News 3182 ...................................	14,15,											   16,22,24PERIODICALSAn Electronic Soapbox:  Computer Bulletin Boards and	the First Amendment, 39 Fed. Com L. J. (1987) ....	passimBecker, The Liability of Computer Bulletin	Board Operators for Defamation Posted	by Others, 22 Conn. L. Rev. (1989) ...............	6,7,9Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability	for User Misuse, 54 Ford. L. Rev. (1985) .........	6,9,10Soma, Smith and Sprague, Legal Analysis of	Electronic Bulletin Board Activities,	7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. (1985) .....................	6MISCELLANEOUSBoardwatch Magazine (May 1991) ........................	8Brand, The Media Lab (1987) ...........................	8Levy, Macworld (Jan. 1991) ............................	8Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Harvard University	Press, 1983) .....................................	5,9,11Talking On the Computer Redefines Human Contact,	The New York Times, May 13, 1990 .................	10Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1988) .............	11STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION	The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1291.STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE	Amicus curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, with the writtenconsent of the parties, addresses the following issue on appeal:  Whetherthe district court erred in imposing a condition of supervised releaseprohibiting Appellant from owning or personally using a computer.STATEMENT OF THE CASE(i)  Course of Proceedings and Deposition Below	Appellant Robert J. Riggs pleaded guilty to one count ofconspiracy to defraud (18 U.S.C.  371) of an eight count indictmentreturned in the Northern District of Georgia.  He also pleaded guilty toone count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C.  1343) of an eleven count indictmentreturned in the Northern District of Illinois. (FN1)	Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 20, the Illinois case wastransferred to the Northern District of Georgia for entry of the plea andsentencing.  United States District Judge J. Owen Forrester, NorthernDistrict of Georgia, sentenced Mr. Riggs to 21 months imprisonment,ordered him to pay restitution in theamount of $233,880.00, and placed himon supervised release for a term of two years.  The court ordered that Mr.Riggs may not "own personally or directly have control over a computer ofany type for [his] own personal use during the period of supervisedrelease."  R3-75.(ii) Statement of Facts	The conduct with which Mr. Riggs was charged involved unauthorizedaccessing and dissemination of data and information maintained on privatecomputer networks.  At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing for Mr.Riggs and his two codefendants, the district court imposed the followingspecial condition of supervised release:None of the three of you may own personally or directly have control overa computer of any type for your own personal use during the period ofsupervised release.  You may operate computers under your communityservice situation and in employment situations where you are employed by athird person and are being supervised by a third person.  I'm simplysaying that during the period of your supervised release, you may notpersonally use or own a PC or any other kind of computer; is that clear?(R3-75-76). The condition was neither requested nor commented on bycounsel for the government.(iii) Scope of Review	The district court, in imposing the ban on computer ownership andpersonal use, exceeded its authority under the supervised release statute.De novo review of the legality of the condition is therefore appropriate.Cf. United States v.Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 448 (10th Cir. 1990) (reviewof probation condition).	Even if imposition of the condition were not beyondstatutory authority, where, as here, a condition of supervised release (orprobation) restricts constitutional rights, the condition must besubjected to "special scrutiny."  See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 670F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting United States v.Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see alsoUnited States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying NinthCircuit's standard to condition infringing First Amendment rights).(FN2)SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	The district court placed appellant Robert J. Riggs on supervisedrelease for a period of two years and made a condition of the supervisedrelease that Mr. Riggs neither "personally use nor own a PC [personalcomputer] or any other kind of computer."  R3-76.  The statute governingconditions of supervised release requires that conditions create nogreater deprivation of fundamental rights than is "reasonably necessary"to achieve specified purposes of the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act.  See 18U.S.C.  3583(d).  The computer ban cannot meet this standard andthedistrict court's sentence should be modified to eliminate this condition.	The ban on personal ownership and use of computers heavily burdensrights of expression and association protected by the First Amendment.Because of technological advances in computers and telecommunicatons inrecent years, computers have become a major, and in some circumstances theprimary, way that individuals express their views, receive information andideas, and associate with those sharing their interests.  Individualsproficient in the new technology now exercise these fundamental rightsthrough electronic bulletin boards, computer networks and electronic mail.(These facilities are defined infra.)  The ban on computer ownership andpersonal use will make it impossible for Mr. Riggs to exercise his rightsof expression and association through these facilities for two years afterhis release from prison.	A complete ban on computer ownership and personal use is a grosslyoverbroad restriction that is not "reasonably necessary" to accomplishingthe statutory purposes of deterrence, public protection and rehabilitationof the defendant.  Just as a complete ban on personal telephone use wouldbe an overbroad condition of supervised release for a defendant convictedof wire fraud by use of the interstate telephone lines or a complete banon personal use of the mails would be an overbroad restriction for adefendant convicted of mail fraud, so the computer ban is overly broad.	The computer prohibition is far more sweeping than necessary toeffect such purposes as deterring the defendant from committing andprotecting the public from further crimes. The ban indiscriminatelyprevents not just illegal conduct, but all activities on computers,including wholly legitimate ones involving expression and association.Similarly, it prevents all associations with others that can beaccomplished throughcomputers, not merely associations with specific individuals who havecommitted computer crimes.	Comparison with narrow discretionary conditions authorized by thestatute demonstrates the inappropriateness and overbreadth of the computerban.I.  THE PROHIBITION ON OWNERSHIP AND PERSONAL    USE OF COMPUTERS TRENCHES HEAVILY ON RIGHTS    RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION PRO-    TECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT	The rise of computer technology, particularly over the past tenyears, has created new and increasingly important means for citizens tocommunicate and associate with one another.  For individuals, like RobertRiggs, who have become literate in the forms of communication madepossible by computer technology, a prohibition on ownership and personaluse of computers represents a major restraint on rights of expression andassociation protected by the First Amendment.	Advances in electronic communications technology haverevolutionized citizens' abilities to and methods of communicating.  Asone distinguished scholar has put it:The technologies used for self-expression, human intercourse, andrecording of knowledge are in unprecedented flux.  A panoply of electronicdevices puts at everyone's hand capacities far beyond anything that theprinting press could offer.  Machines that think, that bring greatlibraries into anybody's study, that allow discourse among persons ahalf-world apart, are expanders of human culture.  They allow people to doanything that could be done with the communications tools of the past, andmany more things too.Pool, Technologies of Freedom 226 (1983).	For the individual citizen, the personal computer hasbeen the foremost means by which the ability to communicate has beenexpanded.  The owner of a personal computer may, from his or her own home,use electronic bulletin board systems, electronic mail and computernetworks systems.  Each of these services offers unprecedented means ofexpression and association.	Electronic bulletin board systems are computer systems whichpermit users to communicate with others in a variety of ways.(FN3)  Users