can send or "post" messages, read messages left by others, and hold directconversations.  Electronic Soapbox, 39 Fed. Com. L. J. at 217.  Electronicbulletin boards allow electronic conversations, which can occur betweentwo or among hundreds of people.  Id. at 218.  The boards offera unique way for a group of people to discuss an idea or an event.  Oneperson starts the discussion by posting a message.  Others read themessage and add their comments.  One need not respond immediately -- aperson can carefully prepare a reply and post it later.  The peopleinvolved need not be in the same place at the same time and do not have toknow each other.  The participants in the discussion do not even have toknow each other.  Those not actually adding to the discussion can benefitsimply by reading the posted comments.Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54 Ford.L. Rev. 439, 440-41 (1985).  Boards can be used to hold conferences, whichcan be unstructured discussions or structured events such as professionalmeetings or press conferences.  Computer Bulletin Board Defamation, 22Conn. L. Rev. at 212.  Computer networks, like the bulletin boards, offerthe opportunity for numerous individuals to participate in aconference.(FN4)  Bulletin boards and networks thus offer not only a forumfor individuals to exercise their rights of free expression, but also aforum for exercise of the right to receive ideas.  See, e.g., Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972), and cases cited therein.	Many electronic bulletin boards and computer networks offer aservice known as electronic mail ("E-mail") by which a subscriber to acomputer system may send correspondence to another user of the system viaa central computer.  E-mail is addressed to one or more accounts on acomputer system assigned to specific users, and is typically stored on thesystem until read and deleted or stored again.  The privacy of E-mail istypically secured by means of a password so that only individuals withknowledge of an account's password can obtain access to mail sent to thataccount.  Thus computer systems provide a method for individuals to engagein private(FN5) conversations with one another.  Like the use ofelectronic bulletin boards, use of E-mail is widespread.  See ElectronicSoapbox, at 219 n.10; see also Brand, The Media Lab 23, 24 (1987),estimating that by 1987, two and a half million homes were linked toservices providing E-mail and related services and estimating 250 millionto one billion messages a year are transmitted by E-mail.	Because of the popularity and widespread use of personalcomputers, electronic bulletin boards provide a very significant newchannel of communication.  Bulletin Board systems range in size from smallsystems operated by individual using personal computers in their homes tolarger systems operated by commercial organizations.  Two of the largestsystems -- Prodigy, operated by IBM and Sears, and CompuServe, operated byH&R Block -- have over 330,00 users and half a million users respectively.See Levy, Macworld 69 (Jan. 1991), Computer Bulletin BoardDefamation, 22Conn. L. Rev. at 204 n.4.  Industry estimates indicate there areapproximately 32,000 bulletin board systems in operation in the UnitedStates today.  Boardwatch Magazine 8 (May, 1991).	The possibilities for speech and association presented by computerbulletin boards are easily and cheaply available to the public.  "If onehas a personal computer, gaining access to a computer bulletin board is aseasy as dialing a phone number."  Electronic Soapbox, 39 Fed. Com. L. J.at 218.  In fact, in one sense bulletin board systems are simplyextensions of telephone service, since it is usually through a modemconnected to telephone lines that the personal computer user is linked tothe computer operating the board and to other people who themselves are intelecommunication with the board.  Id.	The ease and economy with which communications can be made throughboards makes them an increasingly important method for the individualcitizen to be heard.  "In an age when most forms of mass communication,and thus public debate, are controlled by a small number of people,bulletin boards have the potential to play an important role in theexploration and exchange of ideas."  Bulletin Board Operator, 54 Ford. L.Rev. at 441.  Thus, the boards fairly have been analogized to HydeParkCorner, town meetings, the Democracy Wall, or leafletting, and calledthe printing presses of the twenty-first century.(FN6)	Electronic bulletin boards permit communication on an unlimitedvariety of topics.  Boards have been recognized as an effective forum forindividual expression of opinion on matters of public interest and forpublic debate of controversial issues.  Bulletin Board Operator, 54 Ford.L. Rev. at 440 and 444.  Boards are thus a forum for speech acnowledged tolie at the heart of the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424U.S. 1, 14 (1976), and cases cited therein.	But electronic bulletin boards also address a wide variety ofother subjects and interests, ranging from business to religion.Electronic Soapbox, at 222.  One common subject is computers themselves.Id.  Individuals accessing a board devoted to computer use can, forexample, ask technical questions about particular computer programs orseek advice about computer products and their capabilities.  See ComputerBulletin Board Operator, at 440.(FN7)	Denial of access to computers may close off the sole or at leastthe primary means of associating with those who share one's interests.Electronic bulletin boards may be the only place in which issues one isinterested in are being addressed, audiences one wishes to reach can befound, or information one needs is being offered.  Because of thepossibilities for conversation among many people and the enormousdistances that separate individuals interested in a particular topic, useof an electronic bulletin board may be the only feasible means ofcommunication on that topic.  See, e.g., 'Talking' on the ComputerRedefines Human Contact,  The New York Times, May 13, 1990 at 1("[C]omputer networks often become electronic communities that give peoplethousands of miles apart the feeling of being connected in a smallvillage, with all the intimacy and ease of communication that implies.")	Electronic bulletin boards have also become a means forindividuals to meet and socialize with others who share their interests.The growth of computer networks is changing how people "find friends [and]seek entertainment."  'Talking' on the Computer Redefines Human Contact,The New York Times, May 13, 1990 at 1.(FN8)  Therefore, a prohibition onpersonal ownership and use of computers can grossly interfere with anindividual's right to associate for personal as well as professional andpolitical purposes.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,622 (1984) ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engagein activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right toassociate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends") (citations omitted).	The rapid advance of computer technology to this point hasoutstripped our legal system's ability to understand the proper place thenew technology should hold in our scheme of constitutionalprotections.(FN8)  This disjuncture has surfaced in this case, where thedistrict court's restriction on computer use has swept too broadly,infringing the freedom of speech and association that the First Amendmentguarantees.	The ban on computer ownership and personal use significantlyimpinges on Mr. Riggs' exercise of fundamental rights.  Like a growingsegment of our society, Mr. Riggs communicates primarily through thewritten rather than the spoken word.(FN10)  In his preference for thewritten word Mr. Riggs is similar to many who communicate via computer.It has been recognized that for some people:[electronic bulletin] boards offer an opportunity to know and be known bya nationwide circle, a process called "networking."  Written conversationfavors the witty turn of phrase, not the loudest voice. The instantinteraction allows board communication to avoid the fate of the wellwritten, but slow moving letter.  Finally, anonymity allows the timid toflower:  identity, appearance, possibly even personality, becomeunimportant.Electronic Soapbox, at 224 (footnotes omitted).  To deny Mr. Riggs theright to own and to personally use a computer is to deny him his primarymeans of expressing himself, receiving advice and information, andassociating with others.	The district court's prohibition is extremely broad.  It does notmerely prohibit particular, illegal uses of computers.  Rather, itprevents any use of a computer by Mr. Riggs for his own personal speech orassociation.  While the district court contemplated Mr. Riggs may usecomputers in his community service work and employment, R3-74-76, thoseefforts will be on behalf of others and will offer him no opportunity toexpress himself, receive information of his choosing or associate withwhom he wishes to communicate.(FN11)  The district court's condition willresult in a two-year prohibition on Mr. Riggs' exercise of hisconstitutionally protected rights to communicate and associate with othersthrough electronic means.II.  THE DISTRICT COURT'S PROHIBITION ON MR. RIGGS'     OWNERSHIP AND PERSONAL USE OF COMPUTERS AS A     CONDITION OF HIS SUPERVISED RELEASE IS IMPROPER     BECAUSE IT CREATES A GREATER DEPRIVATION OF      LIBERTY THAN IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO           EFFECTUATE STATUTORY GOALSA.  The Sentencing Reform Act Requires That Con-    ditions Of Supervised Release Not Impinge    Unnecessarily On Liberty Interests	The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C.  3551 etseq. and 28 U.S.C.  991-998, provides, in pertinent part, that thedistrict court which is imposing a term of imprisonment may, and in somecircumstances must "include as a part of the sentence a requirement thatthe defendant be placed on a term of supervised release afterimprisonment. . . ."  18 U.S.C.  3583(a).  Where a term of supervisedrelease is imposed, the statute provides that certain conditions must beimposed and others may be imposed.  In pertinent part, the statuteprovides that discretionary conditions on supervised release may beimposed only to the extent that any such condition:    (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonablynecessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),and (a)(2)(D). . . .18 U.S.C.  3583(d).(FN12)	The statute specifies the types of discretionary conditions whichmay be imposed on a supervised release by reference to the statutoryprovisions listing discretionary conditions of probation.  See 18 U.S.C.3583(d), incorporating 18 U.S.C.  3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12)through (b)(20).(FN13)  The supervised release statutory provisions alsopermit the court to impose other "appropriate" conditions, but only to theextent permitted by the restriction quoted above.  18 U.S.C.  3853(d).The probation statute contains a similar "wildcard" provision.  18 U.S.C.3563(b)(21).	As specified in  3583(d)(2), conditions on supervised release mustinvolve "no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary"to serve the purposes of deterrence ( 3553(a)(2)(B)), public protection (3553(a)(2)(C)), and training, care or treatment of the defendant (3553(a)(2)(D)).  The concern that civil liberties not be unnecessarilyimpinged is reflected in the legislative history of  3583.  See S. Rep. No.225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 125, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3182, 3307 (hereinafter "S. Rep. at ___, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at ___")("Whatever conditions are imposed may not involve a greater deprivation ofliberty than is necessary. . . .").	The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was intended to codify anapproach to the imposition of conditions in sentencing more protective ofcivil liberties than under prior law, which authorized the imposition ofprobation "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best."  Seeformer 18 U.S.C.  3651, repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, c. II,212(a)(1),(2), Oct. 12, 1984.(FN14)	The change in approach is unequivocally spelled out in thelegislative history of  3563(b), the provision which sets out thediscretionary conditions which may be applied in probation and supervisedrelease:Unlike current law, subsection (b) specifically states . . . that anycondition that involves a restriction of liberty must be reasonablynecessary to the purposes of sentencing set forth in section 3553(a)(2).This language is designed to allay the fears of such disparate groups asthe ACLU and the Business Roundtable that probation conditions might betoo restrictive in a particular case or might involve more supervisionthan is justified by the case.  The judge is limited in imposingconditions of probation to imposing only those that carry out the purposesof sentencing in a particular case.  He cannot restrain the liberty of adefendant who does not need that level of punishment or incapacitation. .. .S. Rep. at 99, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3282.  The Senate report repeatedlyemphasizes that conditions involving deprivations of liberty or propertymust be "reasonably necessary" to the purposes of the statutory sentencingprovisions to be upheld.  See, e.g., S. Rep. at 94, 95, 96, 1984U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3277, 3278, 3279.	Because of the significant change in the law, the case law underformer 18 U.S.C.  3651 upholding probation conditions provides the Courtlittle guidance in reviewing conditions imposed under the SentencingReform Act.  See United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 751 n.2 (11thCir. 1988) (noting change in the law).  Whereas previously, conditionsaffecting the exercise of constitutionally protected rights could beupheld if they were "reasonably related" to the purposes of the former 18U.S.C.  3651, see, e.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir.1982)(FN15), under the current law such conditions may only be upheld ifthey effect no greater deprivation of rights than "reasonably necessary" toachieve statutory purposes.(FN16)B.  The Prohibition On Ownership And Personal Use    Of Computers Is A Deprivation Of Liberty Not    Reasonably Necessary To Carry Out The Purposes    Of The Sentencing Statute     1.  The Computer Ban Is Far Too Broad To Be         Reasonably Necessary Or Reasonably Related         To The Statutory Purposes Of Deterrence,         Public Protection And Rehabilitation	A fundamental premise of our law is that those subject to thecorrections system retain their constitutional rights except to the extentthat well-articulated requirements of that system necessitate incursionsinto those rights.  Since this proposition is true for those who areincarcerated, see, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)("[An] inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are notinconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate . . .objectives of the corrections system"), it is a fortiori true forprobationers and those on supervised release.  See, e.g., United States v.Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979).(FN17)	For this reason, "probation conditions that restrictconstitutional rights merit 'special scrutiny.'"  United States v. Lawson,670 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting United States v.Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).  Undercurrent law, to survive this special scrutiny, a condition impingingfundamental rights must be "reasonably necessary" to the needs of theprobation or supervised release system.  Amicus submits that under thecurrent standard -- or even under the former "reasonably related" standard-- the computer ban cannot survive.	The district court acted outside its statutory and discretionaryauthority when it imposed the condition that Mr. Riggs may not own or usefor personal reasons any computer during the two years of his supervisedrelease.  As demonstrated in Point I, ante, the court's condition impingeson Mr. Riggs' First Amendment interests, and therefore the condition mustmeet the requirement of  3583(d)(2).  The ban on computer ownership andpersonal use is grossly overbroad and is not reasonably necessary toachieve the statutory goals of deterrence, protection of the public, andrehabilitation.(FN18) Furthermore, it is counterproductive to the purposeof rehabilitation.	The overbreadth of the ban is most graphically illustrated byanalogy.  The condition imposed here is equivalent to a conditionprohibiting an individual convicted of committing wire fraud by means ofinterstate telephone calls from owning (or leasing) a telephone and frommaking any personal, unsupervised calls.  Analogy to telephone calls isparticularly appropriate here, since it is generally by use of telephonelines that the user of a personal computer communicates with bulletinboards, networks and other individual computer users.  See ElectronicSoapbox, 39 Fed. Com. L. J. at 218.  Presumably, it is precisely Mr.Riggs' ability to "call out" from his computer that the sentencing judgeintended to halt, so that he cannot gain unauthorized access to networkservices or data.(FN19)  But the ban does not merely prevent Mr. Riggs>from calling systems he is not authorized to enter.  It prohibits him fromcalling any system or person.  It also prevents him from receivingcommunications.  A sentencing judge in a wire fraud case wouldunquestionably conclude that a complete ban on telephone possession andpersonal use would be an impermissibly overbroad means of preventing arecurrence of the wire fraud.  So, too, a ban on personal computer use andownership to prevent a repeat of unauthorized accessing of computers isimpermissibly overbroad.(FN20)	The ban on personal computer use is also analogous to a generalprohibition on personal use of the mails as a condition imposed on one