convicted of crimes involving fraudulent use of the mails.  One suchcondition prohibiting use of the mails was recognized to be an overbroadrestriction on First Amendment rights and was struck down.  United Statesv. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984).	Holloway involved a prison inmate who was convicted of aconspiracy with other inmates to file false tax returns.  She received asentence that included periods of incarceration and probation.  Thedistrict court imposed two restrictions on Holloway regarding hercorrespondence.  One prevented her during the period of her probation fromcorresponding with prison inmates.  Id. at 1381.  The court of appealsupheld this limited prohibition, finding it served purposes ofrehabilitation and public protection.  Id. at 1383.  The court found itsignificant that "Holloway became involved in the scheme only by virtue ofher extended correspondence with inmates," and that Holloway made use ofthe mails in committing her crime.  Id.	The district court's second restriction provided that "Hollowaycould 'communicate by mail only with her relatives, legal counsel andother recognized counselors' during the period of her incarceration."  Id.Observing that this prohibition would "forbid Holloway from writingletters to a wide range of persons who had nothing to do with her criminalconduct," the court stated:The limitation on Holloway's ability to communicate with friends, informaladvisors and holders of public office is sufficiently broad to affectvalues and principles which are undoubtedly at the core of the firstamendment.Id.  Finding the condition overbroad, the court struck it down: The present restriction on mailing simply is not carefully drawn to"serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety."  Rather,it imposes a restriction on Holloway which, because of its breadth, doesnot bear a logical relationship to the criminal conduct in which Hollowayhas engaged.  The restriction is not, therefore, reasonably related toachieving rehabilitation and to protecting the public.  Cf. [United Statesv.] Lawson, 670 F.2d [923,] 929-30 [10th Cir. 1982]; [United States v.]Smith, 618 F.2d [280,] 282 [5th Cir. 1980]; Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971).Id. (footnote omitted).	Like the mail restriction struck down in Holloway, the ban oncomputer use is "not carefully drawn" to effectuate statutory purposes and"because of its breadth, does not bear a logical relationship to thecriminal conduct" in which Mr. Riggs engaged.(FN21)  Like the Hollowayban, the computer ban prohibits Mr. Riggs from communicating with a widerange of persons having nothing to do with his criminal conduct.  Whilethe fact that Holloway corresponded with inmates as part of her criminalconspiracy could justify a ban on her correspondence with inmates, itcould not justify a broader ban on her use of the mails.  Similarly, Mr.Riggs' use of a computer to commit his crime does not justify a wholesaleban on his communicating with anyone by computer.	Amicus submits that no rehabilitation is effected by the wholesaleprohibition on personal computer use.  Community service work, which iscontemplated in Mr. Riggs' sentence, is a proper means of rehabilitatinghim.  Prohibiting development of his skills and isolating him fromlegitimate uses and users of computers is surely not "reasonablynecessary" to his rehabilitation.     2.  Discretionary Conditions Specifically Authorized         By Statute Or Imposed In Other Contexts Provide No         Support For The Imposition Of The Computer Ban Here	The computer ban condition is not authorized by the "wildcard"provision of  3583(d), which permits "appropriate" conditions other thanthose specified in the statute.  Nor do the conditions in  3563(b)(1)-(10)and (12)-(20) authorize the computer ban.  Furthermore, comparison withsome of the discretionary conditions specified in the statute demonstratesthe inappropriateness and overbreadth of the computer ban.	The statute contemplates that in appropriate cases an individualmay be required to refrain "from associating unnecessarily with specifiedpersons."  18 U.S.C.  3563(b)(7).  As the legislative history of thisprovision makes clear, a condition limiting associations must be specific,and tailored to the particular circumstances of the defendant.  S. Rep. at97, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3280.  Here the condition in effect prohibits Mr.Riggs' association not just with individuals known to have committedcomputer crimes, but with everyone who uses computers.	Even under prior law, reviewing courts have struck down ormodified probation conditions requiring disassociation which swept toobroadly.  The former Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a caseinvolving a tax protester's conviction for violating the tax laws,disapproved a condition that the protester "divorce [himself] from anyorganization advocating the willful disobedience of any local, state orfederal law...." United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980).  The Court modified the condition to prohibitonly association with organizations advocating disobedience to the taxlaws.  Id.  See also United States v. Patterson, 627 F.2d 760, 761 (5thCir. 1980) (following Smith); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923,929-30 (10th Cir. 1982) (in order to save condition, court interprets itto prohibit only tax protester's associating with groups urgingdisobedience of, as opposed to disagreement with tax laws.)  In this case,the computer prohibition requires wholesale disassociation with everyonewho communicates by computer, and could not withstand scrutiny even underthe analysis of cases decided under prior law.	The prohibition on possession of a computer suggests that thesentencing court had in mind another of the statutory discretionaryconditions -- that the defendant "refrain from possessing a firearm,destructive device, or other dangerous weapon."   3563(b)(9).  Any analogybetween firearms and computers is extremely inapt.  A computer is not adangerous weapon; rather, it is primarily a means of communication andassociation.	Analogies to revocations of drivers' licenses are also entirelyinappropriate.  Unlike a computer, an automobile is not essentially ameans of communication and association.  Driving is an activity licensedby the State, while computer use is First Amendment speech which is not andcannot be regulated or licensed by the government.	Finally, the provision of the statute allowing restraints onindividuals from engaging in specified occupations, businesses orprofessions, 18 U.S.C.  3563(b)(6), provides no support for the impositionof the computer ban.  There is no constitutional right to engage in aparticular job.  For example, it violates no fundamental right to prohibita stockbroker who has committed crimes in the course of his or her work>from selling stock for a period of time.  In contrast, again, the computerban is a limitless incursion into fundamental First Amendment rights.	In rare circumstances, First Amendment rights do attach to a job-- for example, the holding of political office.  See, e.g., United Statesv. Tonry, 605 F.2d at 150.  But in such cases, an individual's commissionof a crime while in public office makes it particularly appropriate toprotect the public by "determining that the very limited activity" ofrunning for or holding public office "should not be accorded him duringprobation. . . ."  605 F.2d at 151.	The condition of restricting employment "should only be used asreasonably necessary to protect the public."  United States SentencingGuidelines,  5F1.5, Commentary, quoting S. Rep. at 96, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.at 3279.  While protection of the public may have necessitated banning thedefendant in Tonry from the "very limited activity" of public office, itis not necessary to bar Mr. Riggs from all personal computer use to protectthe public.     3.  This Court Has Authority To         Strike Down The Computer Ban	It is within this Court's authority to modify the district court'ssentence by eliminating the prohibition on computer ownership and personaluse.  See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.1979).  Amicus submits that because the ban clearly trenches on FirstAmendment rights and is not reasonably necessary to statutory objectivesof deterrence, public protection or rehabilitation, the Court shouldstrike it down, rather than remand to the district court.CONCLUSION	For the foregoing reasons, the sentence of the district courtshould be modified to eliminate the condition of Mr. Riggs' supervisedrelease prohibiting his ownership and personal use of a computer.Dated:  May 17, 1991Respectfully submitted,_____________________________ERIC M. LIEBERMANNICHOLAS E. POSERRABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD,	  KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, P.C.740 Broadway - Fifth FloorNew York, New York 10003(212) 254-1111HARVEY A. SILVERGLATESHARON L. BECKMANSILVERGLATE & GOOD	The Batterymarch Building80 Broad Street - 14th FloorBoston, Massachusetts 02110(617) 542-6663Counsel for Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier FoundationFOOTNOTES:FN1.  Riggs pleaded guilty to a second count of the Illinois indictment,charging interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C.  2314,but the government moved to dismiss the plea as to this count after it wasrevealed that the property was valued at under $5,000, the statutoryminimum.  The government did not make a similar motion as to the wirefraud count because 18 U.S.C.  1343 has no minimum dollar threshold.  SeeSentencing Information Filed on Behalf of the Northern District ofIllinois United States Attorney's Office, submitted with the Government'sSentencing Memorandum and S.G.  5K1.1 Motion.  R1-50-1-2 and 7-8.FN2.  Because the condition applied in this case burdens First Amendmentrights, the abuse of discretion standard, see, e.g., United States v.Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 751 (11th Cir. 1988), is supplanted by a stricterlevel of review.FN3.  See generally Note, An Electronic Soapbox:  Computer Bulletin Boardsand the First Amendment, 39 Fed. Com. L. J. 217 (1987) ("ElectronicSoapbox"), Soma, Smith and Sprague, Legal Analysis of Electronic BulletinBoard Activities, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 571 (1985) (hereinafter"Electronic Bulletin Board Activities"), and Becker, The Liability ofComputer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22Conn. L. Rev. 203 (1989) ("Computer Bulletin Board Defamation").FN4.    Some boards and networks provide for instantaneous conversations.FN5.    Operators of electronic bulletin board systems, like operators oftelephone systems, generally have the technological capability to accessprivate communications.  The privacy of electronic communications isprotected by law.  See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.2701 et seq.  Some systems operators as a matter of policy or by contractwith users ensure that no one but the intended recipient can read E-mail.FN6.  See, e.g., Computer Bulletin Board Defamation, 22 Conn. L. Rev. at204; Pool, Technologies of Freedom 189.FN7.  As the government noted, one of Robert Riggs' three main objectiveswas to "learn C Programmming".  Government's Sentencing Memorandum andS.G.  5K1. 1 Motion at 11.  R1-50-11.  The computer ban will cut him off>from useful sources of information on this subject.FN8.  Stories have been reported of on-line courtships, id., and on-linewedding receptions and parties.  Electronic Soapbox at 219 n.9.FN9.  See Tribe, American Constitutional law 1007 (1988) (quoting Pool,Technologies of Freedom 7 (1983)).FN10.  As his attorney emphasized at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Riggsdoes not speak well, but "writes very well."  R3-38.  In fact, inpreparing his case, he communicated with his attorney primarily throughwritten notes and observations.  Id.FN11.  It is unclear whether the district court intended to permit"supervised" personal use of a computer.  Even if so, it is simplyunrealistic to suppose that Mr. Riggs will obtain "supervision" fromprobation personnel or anyone approved by them which would permit him toengage in personal use of a computer.FN12.  Section  3553(a) sets out the factors to be considered in imposinga sentence.  The provisions of  3553(a) relevant to a determination under3583(d)(2) are:(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . .	(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;	(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;and	(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocationaltraining, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the mosteffective manner. . . .FN13.  See "Recommended Conditions of Probation and Supervised Release(Policy Statement)," which set out "standard" and "special" conditionsthat apply to both probation and supervised release.  SentencingGuidelines  5B1.4.FN14.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 842 (3rd Cir. 1981),quoting former 18 U.S.C.  3651.FN15.  See also United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979).This standard was held to facilitate "'an accommodation between thepractical needs of the probation system and the constitutional guaranteesof the Bill of Rights.'"  Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d at 1366, quotingUnited States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 923 (1978).FN16.  The change in statutory language from "as the court deems best" to"reasonably necessary" unquestionably reflects a change to a morerestrictive standard allowing less intrusion on fundamental rights.  Cf.United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980).FN17.  The justifications for restricting the freedoms of probationers andthose on supervised release will always be lesser than those forrestricting prisoners.  Safeguarding  institutional security is a centralobjective of prison administration used to justify intrusions onprisoners' rights, see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47(1979), which has no relevance to individuals living outside the prisons.FN18.  Section 3583(d)(2) notably excludes from consideration the factorsset out in  3553(a)(2)(A), including the "seriousness of the offense" and"just punishment."FN19.  There is no conceivable justification for a prohibition on Mr.Riggs' engaging in activities on a personal computer disconnected from anyother computer, such as word processing.  Yet, the judge's overbroadcondition also prohibits these solitary activities.FN20.  It is a mandatory condition of supervised release that Mr. Riggsnot commit another crime.  18 U.S.C  3583(d).  Imposing a discretionarycondition completely barring him from computer ownership and personal useis an extremely blunt and unnecessary tool for securing his compliancewith the condition that he commit no crimes to which he is already bound.FN21.  The district court's computer ban is broader than the mailrestriction struck down in Holloway.