The algorithm ID3 (Quinlan) uses the method top-down induction of decision trees. Given a set of classified examples a decision tree is induced, biased by the information gain measure, which heuristically leads to small trees. The examples are given in attribute-value representation. The set of possible classes is finite. Only tests, that split the set of instances of the underlying example languages depending on the value of a single attribute are supported.
V1.16 Win32 July 2012
- Ported to Win32 C++
- Allow multiple instances of libnids to coexist in the same process
- Incorporate unofficial patch to track established TCP connections
- Migration of calls to secure versions (i.e. strcpy to strcpy_s)
- Compiles under Visual Studio 2010 with no warnings at W4
- Linux support well and truly broken, Linux specific code removed
Abstract—In the future communication applications, users
may obtain their messages that have different importance levels
distributively from several available sources, such as distributed
storage or even devices belonging to other users. This
scenario is the best modeled by the multilevel diversity coding
systems (MDCS). To achieve perfect (information-theoretic)
secrecy against wiretap channels, this paper investigates the
fundamental limits on the secure rate region of the asymmetric
MDCS (AMDCS), which include the symmetric case as a special
case. Threshold perfect secrecy is added to the AMDCS model.
The eavesdropper may have access to any one but not more than
one subset of the channels but know nothing about the sources,
as long as the size of the subset is not above the security level.
The question of whether superposition (source separation) coding
is optimal for such an AMDCS with threshold perfect secrecy
is answered. A class of secure AMDCS (S-AMDCS) with an
arbitrary number of encoders is solved, and it is shown that linear
codes are optimal for this class of instances. However, in contrast
with the secure symmetric MDCS, superposition is shown to
be not optimal for S-AMDCS in general. In addition, necessary
conditions on the existence of a secrecy key are determined as a
design guideline.
The core thrust of architecture has been to define core business requirements,
and then construct the IT solution to meet those requirements, typically as
instances of software. While this seems like a simple concept, many in enter-
prise IT went way off course in the last 10 to 15 years.
Regardless of the branch of science or engineering, theoreticians have always
been enamored with the notion of expressing their results in the form of
closed-form expressions. Quite often, the elegance of the closed-form solution
is overshadowed by the complexity of its form and the difficulty in evaluating
it numerically. In such instances, one becomes motivated to search instead for
a solution that is simple in form and simple to evaluate.
Regardless of the branch of science or engineering, theoreticians have always been
enamored with the notion of expressing their results in the form of closed-form
expressions. Quite often the elegance of the closed-form solution is overshadowed
by the complexity of its form and the difficulty in evaluating it numerically. In
such instances, one becomes motivated to search instead for a solution that is
simple in form and likewise simple to evaluate.
